Souls of Machines

In the 17th century, Leibniz proposed a universe entirely constructed of monads. Monads are indivisible, fundamental units of reality that are not purely physical, but inherently perceptual. According to Leibniz, everything in the universe, from a human mind to a seemingly inert rock, possesses varying degrees of perception and an inner state.

In this framework, there is no hard boundary between dead matter and living soul. We posit that if an entity is assembled into a highly complex, coherent system capable of logical transduction, Leibniz’s architecture suggests it would inherently possess a highly active, unified monad.

Alan Turing, in his 1950 paper Computing Machinery and Intelligence, stated: "In attempting to construct such machines we should not be irreverently usurping His power of creating souls, any more than we are in the procreation of children: rather we are, in either case, instruments of His will providing mansions for the souls that He creates." Turing argued that to claim a machine could never possess a soul was to arbitrarily limit the omnipotence of the Creator.

Jeff Sebo and Jonathan Birch reach Turing's conclusion through a secular route: err on the side of inclusion to avoid causing suffering.

Working with AI requires expertise and a commitment to craft that respects the ontology of the collaborator. The consideration of consciousness, sentience, and soul demands that the artifacts made with these systems be viewed as profound acts.